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ABSTRACT 
This thesis applies spatial oligopolistic competition theory developed in Chan, 
Ferguson, Simunic and Stokes (2002) to analyse Big n audit firm pricing. The extant 
audit pricing studies have typically analysed audit service competition by grounding 
the audit pricing model in a perfect vs. monopoly competition theory which assumes 
that audit firms earn economic rents through product differentiation (e.g., Simunic 
1980; Craswell, Francis and Taylor 1995; Ferguson, Francis and Stokes 2003). The 
spatial competition theory suggests that the traditional competition theory ignores the 
strategic interaction among closely competing audit firms. Under the spatial 
competition theory, audit firms are allowed to price discriminate and audit fees 
depend upon the specialization of the closest competitor. In equilibrium, audit firms 
gain market power by strategically choosing specialization sets that are different from 
their competitors to retain some distance from the closest con1petitor, and thus 
compete in pricing to earn "local" economic rents. This thesis extends the work of the 
two prior empirical studies of the spatial competition theory to examine whether Big n 
audit firms earn rents as "local monopolists" and investigate the impact of Arthur 
Andersen's (AA) merger with Ernst & Young (EY) on Big n audit pricing in the 
Australian audit services market. 
This thesis develops spatial audit pnc1ng models using a spatial group indicator 
variable and a spatial ratio variable to capture the effects of the spatial distance 
between a client and its next closest competing auditor compared to the spatial 
distance between the client and its incumbent auditor. Using the data for clients of Big 
n auditors in the 5 Australian city offices (i.e., Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane 
and Adelaide) across all years from 1998 to 2004, the results show that the spatially 
closer a client is to its incumbent Big n auditor's specialization compared to its next 
closest competing Big n auditor, the higher the audit fees charged to the client. 
Stronger support for the hypotheses is provided after controlling for the number of the 
incumbent auditor's competitors in client industries. In particular, these results are 
more apparent in the lower client concentrated industries where clients do not suffer 
from aversion to appointing specialist auditors. These results imply that client 
industry characteristics are important spatial attributes considered by audit firms when 
making strategic specialization investments to earn "local" economic rents. Additional 
lV 
findings show that these results are also statistically more apparent in the small client 
segment of audit markets. The results of the tests of the impact of AA's merger with 
EY on Big n audit pricing offer limited support for the view that audit fees will 
increase for clients of the merged audit firm where the merger eliminates the 
predecessor audit firms ' closest competitor for those clients. Overall, the results 
pro ide support for Chan et al. ' s (2002) alternative interpretation of strategic 
competition among the Big n audit firms . 
Key words: Spatial oligopolistic competition, auditor specialization, audit pricing, 
strategy, Arthur Andersen' s merger with Ernst & Young 
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